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Configuration is defined as the entailment of a set of co-present relationships embedded in a
design, such that we can read a logic into the way in which the design is put together. We
discuss conceptual shifts during design with particular emphasis on the designer’s under-
standing of what kind of configuration the particular design is. The design for the Unitarian
Church offers an historical example of such shifts, authorised by Kahn’s own post-rational-
isation of the design process. We subsequently construct a formal computational experiment
where the generation, description and re-conceptualisation of designs is rendered entirely
discursive. The experiment serves to clarify the nature of conceptual shifts in actual
design, and the reasons why a reading of such shifts cannot be based on discursive evidence
only but necessarily requires us to engage presentational forms of symbolisation aswell. Our
examples demonstrate how a conceptual shift within a particular design can lead to the dis-
covery of a new potential design world. In the historical case, the conceptualisation of a new
design world remains implicit and inadequately specified. But the theoretical experiment
allows us to make explicit how geometrically similar configurations that arise from the appli-
cation of one set of generative rules may possess systematic but entirely unanticipated
perceptual properties, subsequently incorporated in new generative rules.
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Induction infers a rule. Now, the belief of a rule is a
habit. That a habit is a ruleactive inus, is evident.…
Induction, therefore, is the logical formula which
expresses the physiological process of formation
of a habit. Hypothesis substitutes, for a complicated
tangle of predicates attached to one subject, a
single conception. Now, there is a peculiar sen-
sation belonging to the act of thinking that each
of these predicates inheres in the subject. In hypo-
thetic inference this complicated feeling so pro-
duced is replaced by a single feeling of greater
intensity, that belonging to the act of thinking the
hypothetic conclusion.…We may say, therefore,
that hypothesis produces the sensuous element of
thought, and induction the habitual element.
C. S. Peirce, ’Deduction, induction and hypothesis’,
Thepopular sciencemonthly, 13 (1878), pp.481–2.
Configuration and imaginative attention in
architectural design
This paper discusses conceptualisation and concep-
tual shifts with a bearing on a particular kind of atten-
tion elicited by buildings: imaginative attention
applied to the appreciation of built form. Thus, we
begin with a brief introduction of what we mean by
imaginative attention and how it features in the
context of design thinking. Herbert Simon defined
design by suggesting that it is concerned with how
things ought to be in order to attain goals and to
function.1 In the case of architecture, the goals of
design are usually set by the charge that the client
gives to the architect, and more fully described in
the building programme. Architects often introduce
additional goals, including stylistic preferences, per-
sonal design idioms or the desire to situate them-
selves within a design tradition.2 A design is
typically evaluated as to whether it incorporates all
the specifications of the programme; takes into
account state of the art professional knowledge
about buildings of a certain function-type, such as a
school or a hospital; responds to relevant criteria of
performance, for example creating a comfortable
environment, or operating within specified cost
limits over time; and conforms to, or extends, a
prior understanding of styles and compositional
languages.
The degree to which functional aims and criteria
are all equally explicit or amenable to objective
evaluation is open to discussion. House design, for
example, often takes for granted cultural norms
and expectations that are not stated in the brief;
or, it responds critically to past social conventions
in order to articulate emerging social identities and
models of everyday life.3 Confronted with other
kinds of buildings, architects must often decide
which among competing sets of design principles
is most applicable. In office design for example,
different client organisations may have different
sets of requirements regarding the importance of
privacy, the kinds of interactions or collaborations
that must be supported by design, or the manner
in which space is allocated and used.4 But, with
the caveat that articulating applicable functional cri-
teria and goals is not always straightforward,
Simon’s phrase succinctly sums up a broadly
shared idea about what design is.
Pevsner’s dictum that ‘the term architecture
applies only to buildings designed with a view to
aesthetic appeal’5 reminds us of design goals, such
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as those associated with style and composition,
which are inherently much more difficult to articu-
late with precision. Relative to such goals, design
decisions and design evaluation depend on the exer-
cise of judgement. Rather than deal with aesthetic
appeal in all its aspects, here we deal with a more
limited question: how does a designer think about
a building so as to make it more likely that visitors
and users will come to see it as the result of deliber-
ate design effort? We do not claim that this question
is always raised, less so that it always is given promi-
nence. But the question goes to the heart of certain
kinds of design conceptualisation that are funda-
mental to architecture.
We propose that a designer who is sensitive to this
question thinks about the building’s logical form.
Here, we have in mind Susanne Langer’s proposition
that logical form is about structure, or the way in
which a thing is constructed.6 She draws attention
to the fact that ‘putting things together’ is not only
a matter of physical but also of logical assembly.
Thus, the particular kinds of conceptualisation that
we discuss in this paper pertain precisely to the
logic of how a design is put together, so that its rel-
evant properties appear to derive from a compo-
sitional principle. To clarify what is at stake we
need to address the ideas of configuration and con-
figurational meaning.
Hillier used an ingenious example to define con-
figuration as relations taking into account other
relations (Fig. 1).7 Two rooms, A and B, have a door
between them, as in Figure 1.1. Depending on
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Figure 1. Configuration
defined as relations
taking into account
other relations (drawn
by the authors).
whether each of the two rooms or only one of them
has a door to the exterior, their direct relationship,
while physically the same, is qualitatively changed.
If both rooms have a door to the exterior, their
relationship is symmetrical. If only room A has such
a door, then their relationship is asymmetrical, with
room A controlling access to room B. The particular
example used to define configuration is closely
linked to social function and meaning. In the asym-
metrical relationship, room B is more ‘private’ relative
to room A, perhaps a bedroom; room A might lend
itself to function as a day room or living room. Also
note that the power of the example partly derives
from the fact that elements and relationships are
taken to be discrete, obvious, and amenable to rep-
resentation using simple graphs.
Suppose that instead of having one door between
rooms A and B we place two doors, as in the top row
of Figure 1.2. Hillier’s argument regarding the
alternative possible relations to the exterior would
remain intact. Now suppose that the doors are
pushed to the extremities of the internal wall, as in
the second row of Figure 1.2. The graph remains
unchanged. However, by virtue of maintaining the
continuity of the outer boundary, the new geometry
lends itself to the interpretation that a single large
space is being subdivided. By contrast, in the top
line of Figure 1.2, the most likely interpretation is
that the two rooms are independently defined and
brought together by addition. These interpretations
do not change the graph representation of connec-
tions. Yet, they are about relations (room adjacency
and connectivity) taking into account other relations
(of addition or subdivision). What is at stake is the
inferred logic of derivation. An architect who
engages the issue might be looking for ways to
induce the user or visitor into imaginatively ‘recon-
structing’ such derivation, based on clues (such as
theplacement of theopenings) offered by thedesign.
Now suppose that we keep a single connection
between rooms A and B, but take it right at the
front, along the external wall. As shown in the first
row of Figure 1.3, we could describe this arrange-
ment by graphs identical in structure to Hillier’s.
However, in the case where each of the rooms A
and B have a door to the outside, the new arrange-
ment might suggest a ‘circulation zone’ along the
front of the building, as shown in the second row
of Figure 1.3, by virtue of the fact that we can
move in one door and out the other without sub-
stantially penetrating the rooms. This interpretation
is less convincing in the case where only room A
has a door to the exterior. The difference is also
deeply configurational, and concerns the emergence
of a third space by virtue of the disposition of con-
nections between the original two spaces and the
exterior. In this case what is at stake is our way of
parsing the given design into elements and relation-
ships. Depending on such parsing, and the reading
of the affordances of the design, different behav-
ioural and furniture arrangements might be implied.
Accordingly, we propose a modified definition of
configuration. Configuration is the entailment of a
set of co-present relationships embedded in a
design that allows us to read a logic into their co-pres-
ence. Through the exercise of imaginative attention,
the entailment of relationships might be assessed
from the point of view of functional implications, or
from the point of view of logical derivation, or from
the point of view of parsing the design into new
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elements and relationships, so as to read new affor-
dances relative to habitation and space use. Theques-
tion then becomes how configurational meaning, or
the understanding of these multiple chains of entail-
ment, is conceptualised during design, so that the
products of design are imbued by a logical form.8
Below we examine what is at stake through the
examination of examples. Prior to presenting the
examples, we must address some methodological
problems that derive from the nature of configur-
ations: The entailment of relationships within a con-
figuration can always be richer than a particular
discursive description or representation of the con-
figuration may capture. Thus, understanding the
process of designing and the product being
designed requires a continuous trade between
reading conceptual content in drawings and consid-
ering discursive or diagrammatic clarifications of
what is at stake.
The problem of reading conceptual content in
design
Architectural design thinking is intrinsically documen-
ted in drawings, even as words, diagrams, numbers,
or charts are necessary to explain design decisions,
direct attention to significant characteristics of the
design, or evaluate it against a given set of criteria.
The essential function of drawings is to represent
the building. Representation is handled by the rules
of geometrical projections, ranging from perspectives
that come close to capturing the actual view of a
building from a particular point, to orthogonal projec-
tions that maintain consistency of measurement in a
chosen plane. In addition, drawings also feature nota-
tional conventions—thickness of lines, angles of
picture plane, colors, and use of writing or graphical
symbols. Insofar as a design is the outcome of think-
ing, however, drawings implicitly also document a
way of thinking. Thus, we may distinguish between
the main instrumental purpose and the broader sym-
bolic functions of drawings. The instrumental
purpose is to describe a design, usually in a way
that can instruct those who will implement it. Their
symbolic function encompasses the expression of a
way of thinking about the particular design
represented, or about architecture in general.9 The
symbolic content of drawings, however, is not
immediately apparent and cannot be deciphered
according to simple notational conventions. By impli-
cation, architectural design thinking, as expressed in
drawings, cannot easily be put into words.
To understand why this is so, it is useful to remem-
ber, again, the work of Susanne Langer.10 She drew
a distinction between discursive and presentational
symbolism. Discursive symbolism requires that
ideas are ordered in sequence as in language,
while presentational symbolism allows that ideas
are presented all at once as in pictures. The funda-
mental difference between language and pictures,
as Langer saw it, pertains to the way in which a sym-
bolic composition becomes meaningful. Language
has a vocabulary of words with defined meanings,
a syntax that allows words to be composed in
sequence, the possibility of defining the meaning
of each word using other words, the possibility of
using alternative words for the same meaning and
the power to express general statements.11 A
picture, on the other hand, has elements whose
identity and reference cannot be defined outside
the picture itself. The picture functions as a symbol
219
The Journal
of Architecture
Volume 20
Number 2
only through the relationships sustained by elements
within the total structure. Finally, a picture can
convey generality only by explicit specification,
whereas the meaning of words is inherently
general. Langer’s motive for drawing this distinction
was to argue that both kinds of symbolism partake
in our conceptualisation of the world and are
subject to logical formulation of how things are
put together. She, like many others, opposed the
view that systematic thinking is exclusively
expressed in language or other discursive forms of
symbolism.
Architecture, of course, is unlike pictures or
language. Like pictures, it works presentationally,
by articulating elements and relationships between
elements into an integral whole. But, to complicate
matters further, unlike pictures, it is not available
‘all at once’ and can only be comprehended
through movement and through an active effort to
construct a mental image of the building as a
whole.12 Drawings are a designer’s means to
engage with such non-discursive content in architec-
ture. However, as we have discussed, architecture is
subject to design criteria that are stated discursively
ahead of design. It is also subject to evaluation
during and after design, in terms of performance
expectations that are also stated discursively. Com-
positional and stylistic principles, or design genera-
tors may also find discursive expressions. In order to
relate discursive and non-discursive meanings, archi-
tects often use diagrams, sometimes drawn before
and sometimes drawn after the design is devel-
oped.13 In such cases, diagrams often appear to
have the force of a generative idea—a concept—pre-
senting the building as a built instance of a stated
proposition. But unless such diagrams can be
inferred from the formal character of the building,
the proposition they describe will remain opaque to
visitors or users. It follows that if a designer intends
users or visitors to become aware of propositional
content, their design needs to meet an additional
burden—to ensure that its conceptual content is
inferable in its form, that is, in its presentational
aspect. Thus, the tension between presentational
and discursive modes of symbolisation reaches into
the core of architectural design thinking. It may
even be its defining character.
In what follows, and given our interest in how
conceptual ideas are inferable from design, we do
not give priority to the question ‘how does a
design concept, expressed in words or in diagrams
and words, get developed into a design’ but rather
to the complementary question ‘how does the pro-
duction of drawings during design support emer-
gent conceptualisations’. In short, we focus on the
two-way traffic between Langer’s discursive and
presentation modes of thinking during design.
Quite naturally, conceptualisation is a primary
consideration in the earliest stages of design, when
designers come to terms with a design problem.
This, however, should not lead to the conclusion
that conceptualisation occurs in the earlier stages
only or that design is a one-way process from
abstraction to concretion.14 Of course, in the
earlier stages of design, architects explore how
design knowledge already acquired, including
experience with building types, relevant precedents
and formal rules, might help come to terms with
the problem at hand.15 Conceptualisation,
however, can extend late in the design process, as
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shown by many researchers.16 As design progresses,
the role of the architectural drawing is not merely to
provide evidence for deductive reasoning (does the
emerging form fit the adopted concept?), but to
provide an empirical basis for abductive inferences
too (what concept could be inferred from emerging
design?).17 We are thinking particularly of abduction
as described by Peirce:18 properties present in the
design or striven towards in the course of elabor-
ation of the design, are construed as derivable
from a conceptual form abduced from reflection
on the drawings.19
The difficulty with describing the conceptual
content of a design lies precisely in the tensions
between discursive and presentational forms.
Words help us see things in a design or think
about a design in a particular way, but do not
replace it. A critical function of words is to point to
the relevant properties of the design which are
present in the drawings.20 The reason why words
are necessary is that the conceptual content of draw-
ings cannot be interpreted based on notational con-
ventions. To recognise the abstract ideas that might
be inherent to a design we must often look at draw-
ings in non-notational terms and focus on what the
drawing directly depicts (for example, particular
shapes) or what the drawing exemplifies (for
example, the consequences of applying compo-
sitional rules such as symmetry, axiality, layering or
overlap). The fact that drawings can be looked at
from such different points of view has led some
scholars to adapt the analytical terminology devel-
oped by Goodman21 to their study: Goel,22 for
example, suggests that earlier design phases are
characterised by forms of drawing that incorporate
ambiguity and are open to multiple interpretations
because lines could ‘mean’ different things; design
development is marked by drawings that become
increasingly precise and disciplined by specific rep-
resentational conventions.
We will examine two distinct examples, one docu-
mented in the history of architecture, and the other
constructed artificially for the purposes of argument.
We discuss a particular aspect of conceptualisation,
namely the clarification not of what the design is,
but what kind of thing it is, or what it should be
‘seen as’. The first example is the case of Louis
Kahn working on the Unitarian Church Project in
Rochester and reconceptualising the design late in
its development. Reconceptualisation did not
involve notable departures from an original organis-
ing schema stated in a diagram. Still, it fundamen-
tally altered Kahn’s own understanding of the
project and helped settle important design decisions.
As these decisions got settled so the project is pre-
sented to our own understanding not as a mere
realisation of the abstract organising schema—one
of many that were explored within the design
process itself or one of the even greater number
that we could imagine—but as a specific configura-
tional concept that was not prescribed by the organ-
ising schema.
The fact that Kahn reflected back on the project
and offered to reconstruct his design thinking,
helps interpret the presentational conceptualisation
implicit in his drawings and sketches with some
authority. Authority is exercised in directing our
attention to specific design issues, in leading us to
see particular things in the design as we are invited
to understand the design in a particular way.
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Authority is also exercised in framing the design
exploration within a ‘design space’, that is, a particu-
lar sub-set of the many alternatives that we could
imagine deriving from the initial diagram.
The second example is computational so that all
generative and interpretative authority is explicitly
invested in procedures. All possible designs arising
from a given set of rules are listed as members of a
design world. The design world is then analysed
from the point of view of alternative criteria, each
applied automatically. As a result, the world is parti-
tioned into different sub-sets, according to the new
descriptions of the designs. The sub-sets stand as
extensional definitions of new concepts, concepts
that were not stated in the original rules that
produced the world of designs. The rules are then
re-written to incorporate explicitly, and control for,
the new descriptions. The aim of the exercise is to
distinguish between producing a new design and
producing explicit new distinctions or a new under-
standing of what is possible and what holds interest
within a design world. Thus, the second example
serves as a formal and explicit model of the cognitive
processes that may be implicit in the first.23
Kahn’s design of the Unitarian Church in
Rochester, 1959–1961
Among the buildings of the second part of the twen-
tieth century whose design is reasonably well docu-
mented, the Unitarian Church at Rochester is of
particular interest (Fig. 2). The different solutions
worked out by Louis Kahn between 1959 and
1961 could be interpreted as variations of an arche-
typical compositional intent: centralised plan with
centripetal organisation of programme. Successive
drawings document the adaptation of such intent
to the context of design and the interaction
between the architect and the client. A more
careful analysis of the successive drawings produced
during the ‘second phase’24 leads us to a different
interpretation. Despite the resemblance of plans to
each other, particularly from the point of view of
functional organisation, the evolution of the design
is marked by a fairly sharp discontinuity of architec-
tural conceptualisation. A first phase where compo-
sition is handled as an additive agglomeration of
discrete units around a central core gives way to a
second phase where the scheme is characterised
by continuous bounding surfaces peripherally
layered around a centre. The syntactic discontinuity
between the two phases has important implications
for the manner in which the design becomes experi-
entially and perceptually present as a configur-
ation.25
Figure 2.1 shows the initial design proposal, pre-
pared in 1959. The geometry of the plan consists
of an outer square, a circle, a dodecagon and an
inner square, all concentric. These shapes function
as a frame for arranging the programme. The assem-
bly hall is placed in the middle, surrounded by an
ambulatory, which separates it from the rest of the
building. A peripheral corridor along the outer
edge of the ambulatory leads to all other rooms.
The programme itself comprises four basic elements:
library, teaching and assembly rooms, administrative
offices, and support spaces. Kahn uses geometry
very characteristically in order to express the pro-
gramme. Thus, he seems to think that the organis-
ation of the programme along the perimeter, with
emphasis on teaching, defines an envelope for the
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Figure 2. Selections
from drawings and
sketches for the First
Unitarian Church and
School Project,
Rochester (Louis I. Kahn
Collection, University of
Pennsylvania and
Pennsylvania Historical
and Museum
Commission, # 1977):
2.1, plan at the end of
the first design phase,
December, 1959 (detail
of Ronner 87 UNC 12-
17); 2.2, sketch
published in Kahn,
1961 (detail of Ronner
87 UNC 12-17); 2.3,
earlier version of the
organisational schema,
copy of diagram drawn
by Kahn during the first
meeting with clients,
July, 1959 (detail of
030.I.A.525.1); 2.4,
plan from the second
design phase, January,
1961, version adopted
for construction (030.IV.
B.525.1.15); 2.5, the
sequence of sketches
documenting the
transformation from a
two-block scheme
desired by the clients
into Kahn’s preferred
concentric scheme,
sketch dawn by Kahn in
the course of his
interview with
sanctuary contained within. A certain tension
between the educational component of the pro-
gramme and the sanctuary is expressed in the med-
iating role of the circle and the dodecagon placed
between the two squares. A similar tension is sup-
ported by the sketch published in Perspecta26 (Fig.
2.2), accompanying an interview with Kahn. The
sketch should not be read merely as an affirmation
of a centralised organisational principle. In this
regard, it is different from another similar sketch
found in Kahn’s archives at the University of Pennsyl-
vania (Fig. 2.3). The sketch shown in Perspecta
depicts not only a topological principle, but also a
particular geometric realisation that engenders the
tension and dialogue between square and circle.
The plan of the building as built is presented in
Figure 2.4. There are two obvious differences rela-
tive to the first proposal that was presented in
December, 1959. First, the new solution is more
economical. Second, the functional programme is
arranged in wings, with the library near the
entrance, and support spaces, administration and
teaching/assembly spaces along successive sides
moving clockwise. Kahn explains that the client
initially envisaged a building divided into two
volumes, one housing the sanctuary and the other
school, offices and support spaces such as the
kitchen. We could hypothesise that the client had
in mind the organisation of a similar Unitarian
Church designed by Frank Lloyd Wright thirty-two
years earlier (Fig. 3). In the sketches shown in
Figure 2.5 Kahn explained to his interviewer for
the Perspecta articles how at a meeting with the
committee overseeing the design, he was able to
convince the clients of the superiority of his
concentric scheme. The sketches illustrate how he
began with a hypothetical bi-polar plan desired by
the clients, and then led the committee to see that
some support activities would work better if relo-
cated back to the sanctuary. As the committee
members gradually assented to his moves, one by
one, the entire programme of the ancillary was
shifted to a square ring around the sanctuary.27 If,
however, we read the sketch in Figure 2.5 as an
expression of evolving thinking, we see a pro-
nounced difference between it and the sketches in
figures 2.2 and 2.3. In Figure 2.5, the programme
is broken into partial units that have a distinctive
presence around the church. Similarly, in Figure
2.4, the wings accommodate an additive organis-
ation by distinct functional zones. In the other two
sketches the perimeter of the scheme does not
result from an agglomeration but is an integral
shape.
Can we speak of adherence to the same design
concept when we compare the initial and the final
proposals (Fig. 4)? To a degree, the answer is posi-
tive. As Kahn himself asserts, he succeeded in bring-
ing back the sanctuary to the centre. But this is not
sufficient to explain the subsequent modifications
of the scheme tracked in figures 4.1-4.4, all of
which precede the final design shown in Figure
2.4. The basic programmatic elements were well in
place by the time the scheme in Figure 4.1 was
drawn up. Although there are some differences,
for example those pertaining to the shaping of the
library and the office wing, the drawings seem
subject to the same organising logic. In reality, by
Kahn’s own account, the moment of formulation,
the revelatory moment at which he felt that the
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Perspecta (Kahn, 1961;
detail of Ronner 87
UNC 12-17).
design settled in place, occurred between the
schemes presented in figures 4.2 and 4.3.
The difference between these schemes becomes
clearer if we also consider the respective elevations,
shown in figures 4.5 and 4.6. Figure 4.5 shows that
Kahn first conceived of the building in terms of
repeated units of standardised modules. The units
correspond to main rooms. The modules that
repeat themselves correspond to room and
window widths. In Figure 4.6, on the other hand,
Kahn has moved on to consider a continuously
folding wall with recesses. The window widths are
repeated at less regular intervals. Repetition now
seems secondary relative to the perceived continuity
of the wall. This is a fundamental change relative to
the underlying architectural conceptualisation. From
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Figure 3. Unity Temple
and House, Oak Park IL,
designed by Frank Lloyd
Wright, 1906:
auditorium level plan
showing the sanctuary
and the school housed
in their own distinct
blocks (credit: Historic
American Buildings
Survey, HABS ILL, 16-
OAKPA, 3- [sheet 4 of 7]
—Unity Temple, 875
Lake Street, Oak Park,
Cook County, IL; HABS
is a programme of the
National Park Service of
the United States
Government
established for the
purpose of
documenting historic
places—records consist
of measured drawings,
archival photographs
and written material.
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Figure 4. Further
selections from
drawings and sketches
for the First Unitarian
Church and School
Project, Rochester (all
images from Louis
I. Kahn Collection,
University of
Pennsylvania and
Pennsylvania Historical
and Museum
Commission,# 1977
[KC], unless noted
otherwise): 4.1–4.4,
successive versions of
the ground-level plan
presented during the
second design phase
from June, 1960 to
January, 1961 (KC 030.
IV.B.525.1.8-detail; 030.
IV.B.525.1.16-inverted;
030.IV.B.525.1.17-
stitched; 030.IV.
A.525.5.6); 4.5, North
and East elevations of
the Church
corresponding to the
plan in Figure 4.1 (KC
030.IV.B.525.1.9); 4.6,
North elevation
corresponding to the
plan shown in Figure
4.4 (Digital Image# The
Museum of Modern Art/
Licensed by SCALA / Art
Resource, NY); 4.7,
sequence of sketches
from the Perspecta
interview documenting
the syntactic logic of multiple units aggregated
around a centre, we move to a syntactic logic of
arranging interior spaces between a folding outer
enclosure and an inner core. The fact that the organ-
isation of the plan does not significantly differ across
the two proposals is important. The difference we
highlight is configurational. It does not bear on the
organisation of functions but rather on the manner
in which this organisation is presented to percep-
tion. The change in perceived organisation is impor-
tant because it allows the building to develop a
coherent image. Kahn himself spoke about an emer-
gent gothic sensitivity.28 With this visual image
comes a fundamental shift in the architect’s con-
ception of the building. The design shifts from a
building that is conceived as a centripetal plurality
to a building that is perceived as a unity. We thus
come to appreciate another transformation that
occurs between the plans shown in figures 4.3 and
4.4. The horizontal axis that worked to hold together
the building as a whole, going through the sanctu-
ary, is removed. In the new design the sanctuary is
conceptually seen as a self-contained space, pre-
cisely because the integrating element is no longer
the axis but the surrounding wall.
The shift in conceptualisation, however, does not
seem to have emerged at one go in such clear terms.
Kahn introduces the change talking about one par-
ticular element of the composition, the window.
Using drawings that refer to older buildings, he
notes that windows opened into deep walls, or
windows surrounded by architectural elements that
imbue them with depth, are better at controlling
the quality of light. This is because incoming light
is reflected and glare is controlled. He then proceeds
to discuss how introducing folds in the wall allows
the design of seats inside the window recess, or
how, depending upon the depth of the recess, a
different relationship is established to interior
space: Figure 4.7.
The careful development of a partial element—
the window—leads to an overall shift in the latent
conceptualisation of the overall design. This is in
turn recorded in sketches that show the building
volumetrically, emphasising the outer wall as the
architecturally primary element, according to the
intensity and dynamic of the lines drawn. We are,
therefore, dealing with a process of gradual and ret-
rospective clarification of conceptual transform-
ations. The transformation from figures 4.2 to 4.3
is carried through drawings that reveal the interplay
of abstraction and presentational symbolisation.
Kahn uses drawings not just to verify the geometry
of the emergent forms or to communicate infor-
mation about shape to others, but also to glean
from them those properties of the actual building
that identify it as a particular kind of configuration.
The reconstruction of the logic of a particular
design process and design outcome offered here
resonates with some prevailing ideas in design
studies. The problem that is resolved by Kahn’s rev-
elation of the properties of the deep folded wall is
not quite an ill-defined problem. As discussed in
the literature,29 the ill-defined problem is one
whose solution parameters are not precisely
specified. In this case the functional organisation of
the successive plans remained more or less
untouched.30 The problem that was resolved here
was that of finding a configuration—a logical form
—on the basis of which further design decisions
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the development of the
motif of ‘boxed-in’
windows, triggered by
Kahn’s reflections on the
quality of light in the
thick reveals of classical
windows; this
development occurred
between the schemes
illustrated in figures 4.2
and 4.3, and marks a
moment of conceptual
change occurring late
within the design
development phase (KC
Ronner 77 UNC 33-35);
4.8, perspectival
sketches in Kahn’s hand
exploring the visual
quality of the façades
featuring the boxed-in
window motif (KC
Ronner 77 UNC 30 and
31).
could be taken. In general terms this is consistent
with the pattern of successive problem definitions,
that characterises reflective practice according to
Schön,31 as well as with the idea that the abstract
spaces of problem definition and design solutions
co-evolve during design.32 The idea of the undulat-
ing perimeter wall sustains relationships with a mul-
titude of other ideas: it addresses the issue of the
quality of light, it alleviates the tensions arising
from the prior desire to fit different parts of the pro-
gramme into an additive pattern of repeated
modular units, it complies with the idea of centra-
lised planning that was accepted throughout.
Thus, it would most likely emerge as a ‘good
design idea’, a ‘critical move’ had we had data
that would have allowed us to represent the
process in terms of linkography,33 where a good
idea is defined according to the density of connec-
tions to moves that come before and after.
None of these statements, however, get to the core
of conceptualisation within the design process, as
expressed in the drawings we have available. Concep-
tualisation is about the way inwhich ideas fit together
as an holistic configurational proposition. The coher-
ence that Goldschmidt identifies as a generic aim of
design34 is achieved through a process of abduction.
That is to say, desirable properties are retrospectively
made to appear as deriving from the application of an
abductively inferred set of parsimonious generative
principles. In order to understand more fully the
process of abduction we have to track the conceptual
shift in drawings which describe the design in all its
relevant elaboration, delineation as well as shadow
effects, rhythm of vertical elements as well as continu-
ity of undulation—in Goodman’s terms, in drawings
which are referentially replete.35 Thus, we cannot
agree that the ‘conceptual’ is in evidence primarily
in representations which do not refer to physical attri-
butes as argued by Goldschmidt.36 The more overtly
‘conceptual diagram’ used by Kahn has remained
relatively stable, as the conceptualisation of the
design problem and the design aim have changed.
To state that each of the designs complies with the
abstract conceptual diagram, or can be construed as
being ‘derived’ from it through a process of ‘elabor-
ation in depth’ does not help to explain why Kahn
produced so many variations, or to identify the critical
differences discussed above. Furthermore, the words
used by Khan underscore the incremental manner in
which the configurational shift came about and
gradually became rationalised: ‘There’s a true begin-
ning of it (the meaning associated with windows) in
this plan [Fig. 4.3]. And it became really well
expressed in this plan when the windows—instead
of being so very prevalent as in this plan—became
much more carefully considered [Fig. 4.4]… It’s a
play really of wall and variety in the getting of
various conditions around the windows which
caused me to make these changes.’37 It is only by
considering discursive and presentational symbolisa-
tion together than we can reconstruct the conceptual
shift in design configuration, the configurational
meaning that Kahn points to by talking about a tran-
sition from classicist to gothic sensitivity.
Closing the circle of production, description
and conceptualisation within design: a
theoretical experiment
A computational experiment is constructed, to
provide a formal and entirely discursive account of
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shifts in conceptualising what kind of thing is being
formulated during design. In order to generate a
complete design world, we use a shape grammar,
as defined by Stiny.38 Shape grammars are con-
structed to generate families of shapes by succes-
sively applying shape substitution rules (where you
see a specified shape you may replace it by
another specified shape) to an original shape taken
as a starting point—the assumption is that a given
shape is understood not simply as a figure with a
specific geometry, but as an encoding of a compu-
tational process applied to other shapes. In combi-
nation with a schema for assigning semantic
content to the shapes (labels such as walls,
windows, rooms and so on),39 the generated
shapes can be treated as designs, with the
grammar encapsulating a general generative
approach, say, a style, or an idiom. Thus, shape
grammars function as discursive symbolisations of
design generators. Rules are explicit; it is possible
to decide whether a design is well formed according
to the rules and the initial shape available; and, in
controlled conditions, it is possible exhaustively to
apply the rules to an initial shape and generate all
possible designs. We subsequently apply space
syntax analysis to the design world generated by
the rules, in order to describe functional properties
of the resulting designs, including the way they
might respond to particular programmatic require-
ments and the way they become available to the
understanding of a subject situated inside them
based on their perceptual affordances. Bridging
between shape grammars and space syntax is,
however, incidental to our argument. Our aim is to
model the interaction between design generators
and design effects, in order subsequently to model
with precision what we mean by a shift in configura-
tional conceptualisation.
Figure 5 presents the shape grammar. It includes
four replacement rules and an initial shape. The
initial shape comprises a room 3×3 units and open
corners, placed centrally inside a larger room 7×7.
Given the initial shape, the rules can be verbally
stated as follows. Rule 1: each corner can remain
open as is; rule 2: one of the walls can be extended
outwards by two units of length; rule 3: a corner can
be closed; rule 4: when one of the walls has been
extended in both directions, by any combination or
repetition of the application of the second and
third rules, the initial wall unit can be removed to
create a door opening. The rules are applied to the
initial shape to produce all possible outcomes that
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Figure 5. A shape
grammar with an initial
shape, 5.1 and four
replacement rules, 5.2
(source: the authors).
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Figure 6. All possible
shapes obtained from
the exhaustive
application of the rules
applied to the initial
shape in Figure 5
(source: the authors).
are distinct after taking into account isometric trans-
formations (translation, reflection, rotation). As in
shape grammar conventions, dot notations are
used to control the applicability of rules over the
various sub-shapes of the initial shape, and constrain
the various sequences of development.40 The auxili-
ary use of dots also enables the differentiation
between terminal design states and intermediate
states that allow further operations. Terminal
states do not include any auxiliary dots.
The catalogue of all possible designs from the
exhaustive application of the rules is presented in
Figure 6. Good aesthetic fortune leads to exactly
100 designs. We note that the rules and their out-
comes were initially proposed in order to examine
the logically and perceptually distinct ways in which
four walls on a rectangular grid can define an inner
square space.41 This is an exercise resembling the ear-
liest ones given to entering students in many schools
of architecture. Figure 6 includes a classical roomwith
four doors (6-8.3), a room in Mies’s spin-wheel idiom
(6-4.2) with all walls extending outward beyond the
inner space, a room in Schindler’s idiom (6-8.1),
that is with corners open, and a room in Rietveld’s
idiom (6-2.13), that is, one with an diagonal thrust.
Thus, the shape grammar describes what else is poss-
ible when these paradigmatic kinds of inner rooms
are generated as part of a design world in one par-
ticular way.
Generative rules are of course not equivalent to
rules of reading or evaluating a set of designs.
Suppose that we ask: which design lends itself to
interpretation as an exhibition space that can
accommodate the maximum number of paintings
into an egalitarian arrangement which offers com-
parable access to all? This requirement could be
translated into seeking the design which maximises
wall length and also the connections between result-
ing convex spaces.42 Figure 6-4.2 best responds to
this criterion of evaluation: to keep this paper brief
we do not present the calculation, but the reader
can easily verify the result. Suppose on the other
hand that we are looking for an exhibition layout
which allows one exhibit to stand out as holding par-
ticular value. If we also suppose that an exhibit that
is not immediately exposed but discovered at the ter-
mination of a path will appear to have greater value,
then we would evaluate designs according to depth
measured by transitions across the boundaries of
convex spaces.43 Using this criterion, figures 6-2.5,
6-2.27 and 6-1.24 emerge as best solutions (the cal-
culations are not presented, also in the interests of
brevity). Thus, the catalogue can be taken through
the sieve of diverse evaluation criteria, to highlight
various member designs.
Allowing great but legitimate simplification, this is
the manner in which Simon would understand the
relationship between the heuristic exploration of
possibilities and their evaluation leading to design
choices.44 The problem with this approach is that
the criteria used for evaluation and design choice
do not necessarily interact with the intrinsic logic
of the generative rules. Thus, the essence of compo-
sitional logic is absent from the model of design
process. This is a problem for two reasons. The first
is that, unlike our example here, it is not always poss-
ible to generate all possible designs in order to find
the ones best satisfying our criteria—the designer
needs to proceed by having an intuition about prob-
able functional outcomes of specific generative
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moves. Second, designers, as in the Kahn case
above, are not interested merely in functional
requirements, but also in issues of perception,
specifically, in the qualities of coherence and
feeling associated with the forms that emerge as
generative rules are applied.
Given the initial intention that produced the gen-
erative rules, namely to examine the different ways
in which four modular walls on a rectangular grid
can define an inner space, the designs are analysed
to reveal their perceptual structure from the point of
view of a situated observer.45 The method can be
briefly outlined as follows: the extensions of extend-
ible visibility diagonals are drawn, for all pairs of co-
visible wall endpoints or corners; the convex space
partition resulting from the intersection of these
lines is recognised. We notice that while remaining
in the same convex space, a situated observer is
exposed to the same sub-set of endpoints or
corners, in other words she is placed in a condition
of informational stability relative to shape. We also
notice that when the observer crosses a line, at
least one endpoint or corner is added or subtracted
from the field of vision. We subsequently compute
the centrality of each convex space relative to the
available perceptual changes, according to the
minimum number of other convex spaces that
mediate the path to all other positions in the plan.
Centrality values are then graphically represented
by colouring the plans. In this way we can easily
observe which areas are syntactically nearer the
complete set of visual thresholds implied by
the design, as explored by a situated observer. The
analytical process is explained in Figure 7. The first
drawing indicates that we are interested to charac-
terise a randomly selected position based on the
endpoints and corners that are visible. The second
drawing shows the subdivision of the plan according
to the threshold of visibility of such endpoints or
corners. The third drawing shows the graphic rep-
resentation of centrality relative to visual changes.
How then might the interior quality of the inner
space surrounded by the four walls be perceived
and understood in the light of the analysis? In the
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Figure 7. Partitioning of
a given shape into
convex sub-shapes such
that a constant set of
end-points and corners
is visible from within
each sub-shape: Figure
7.1 shows the corners
and end-points that
have a direct line of
sight from a chosen root
point; Figure 7.2 shows
the sub-division of the
given shape into all its
constituent sub-shapes;
Figure 7.3 shows the
graphic representation
of centrality relative to
visual changes. Distance
is counted by the
minimum number of
sub-shapes that are
crossed to go from each
sub-shape to all others;
lighter shades indicate
sub-shapes with high
centrality and darker
shades those with low
centrality (source: the
authors).
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Figure 8. Patterns of
relative centrality in all
the shapes obtained in
Figure 6. The shapes are
partitioned as described
in Figure 7 and their
sub-shapes coloured
according their relative
centrality: the range
goes from lighter
shades (high centrality)
to darker shades (low
centrality) passing
through intermediate
colours (source: the
authors).
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Figure 9. The fourteen
shapes of Figure 7, in
which the most central
sub-shapes extend or
are entirely outside the
central walls (source:
the authors).
clear majority of the designs in the catalogue, the
centre of the shape lies between these walls, as
we would intuitively expect. This is evident in
Figure 8 which presents the analysis of all one
hundred plans. The inner space is also the central
space from the point of view of visual information
about shape. However, there are fourteen excep-
tions, shown in Figure 9 where they are arranged
in distinct columns. In the four designs of the first
column, 9-4.5, 9-2.8, 9-2.6, 9-1.54, the centre
extends from the inner space out towards the per-
imeter, thus defining a passage. In the designs of
the second column, 9-2.5, 9-2.27, 9-1.24 the
centre lies between the inner space and the per-
imeter, thus defining a threshold. In the designs of
the fourth column, 9-2.12, 9-2.13, 9-2.14, 9-1.23,
9-1.16, 9-1.53, the centre encompasses the inner
space and part of the perimeter, forming an emer-
gent square which is defined in parts by the inner
walls and in parts by the walls of the perimeter.
The single design of the third column, 9-1.18 is a
hybrid and has properties similar to those of both
adjoining columns. Thus, while the catalogue was
generated by a single desire to create an inner
space, the member designs are significantly differen-
tiated as to their perceptual implications, more par-
ticularly the relationship between the inner space
and the structure of centrality relative to visual infor-
mation. The differentiation between geometric and
syntactic centrality noted here is similar to that
which has been observed by Psarra in her study of
actual museum buildings and architectural designs.46
The concept of emergence has been defined in
two notable ways.47 In the context of shape gram-
mars, the word ‘emergence’ describes a situation
where the spatial relationship between two or
more shapes (on the left side of a substitution rule)
produces additional (emerging) new sub-shapes
similar to the initial shapes (on the right side of the
substitution rule)’48 For example, two initial triangles
can be placed into relationships that allow us to
retrieve descriptions of any number between 2 and
8 triangular sub-shapes.49 In the context of the
theory of space syntax,50 ‘emergence’ describes
the complex spatial structure that arises from the
successive local application of simple generative
rules. The drawings of the fourth column of Figure
9 hold special interest because they combine the
two kinds of emergence. Indeed, syntactic emer-
gence leads to the retrieval of a description of emer-
gent shapes. The emerging pattern of syntactic
centrality relative to visual information (syntactic
emergence) leads us to see a square 5×5 that
results from the relationship of the two initial
squares 3×3 and 7×7 (shape emergence).
The analysis of the designs shown in Figure 8 indi-
cates that the results of the compositional rules are
richer than the rules themselves. In very simplified
form, we have an example of discovery within
design. We retrospectively recognise the morpho-
logical implications of the generative rules that
were not explicitly prefigured in the rules themselves,
even as they are linked to the intention associated
with the creation of the rule. But how canwe register
the emergent conditions in the generative rules? Or,
to ask the question in more concrete terms, how can
we reformulate the generative rules so as to discrimi-
nate between, and deliberately control, the subsets
of designs that they will produce? Figure 10 presents
four shape grammars. The first produces the
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Figure 10. Four
alternative shape
grammars. The first
produces the same set
of shapes obtained in
Figure 6. The others
produce a selected
subset of those spaces.
Note the increased
number of rules in G1 as
compared to the
grammar presented in
Figure 5 (source: the
authors).
complete set of designs offered in Figure 6. The
second produces only the designs of the third and
fourth columns of Figure 9. The third produces the
designs of the first column. The last produces the
designs of the second column.
The difference between the initial grammar of
Figure 5 and the first grammar of Figure 10 bears
on the use of different patterns of auxiliary marks.
These are introduced in order to notate spatial
relationships that are linked with the emerging struc-
ture of centrality relative to visual information. In the
interests of economy we do not reproduce the analy-
sis that led to the identification of these relationships
and to the corresponding notations. Readers can
check for themselves that the grammars offered,
when exhaustively applied to the initial shape,
produce the original universe of designs and the par-
ticular design subsets mentioned above.
With the use of additional auxiliary notations,
grammar G1 (Figure 10) encompasses double the
number of rules compared to the original grammar
(Figure 5). The grammar has thus become less
laconic. What is gained is the ability to write the
other three grammars (G2-G4) by means of a differ-
ent deployment of the auxiliary notations. Only one
of the new grammars requires the use of a new sub-
stitution rule that presupposes the identification of a
different sub-shape for its application. In short, the
redundancy of the first new grammar allows the
more elegant formulation of the other three.
From the point of view of the usual approach to
shape grammars, the argument deployed through
Figure 10 may appear to be paradoxical. Usually,
the transformation of grammars is aimed at produ-
cing new designs.51 Why then bother to write new
grammars that produce the same set of designs, or
different subsets of it? The answer to this question
is that the new grammars shown in Figure 10 are
not aimed at enriching the set of designs but
rather at registering new knowledge about it. Con-
figurational meaning is expressed in the writing of
new rules of derivation that incorporate distinctions
arrived at by analysis of the original design world.
The possibility of a new description of any shape,
based on a new set of rules, acts as the compu-
tational equivalent of a new understanding. Design
does not advance only when the object designed is
being changed. Design also advances when the
manner of thinking about the object changes.
Once explicitly registered, the interplay between
geometric and syntactic centrality ‘discovered’
could be transferred to different shapes and relation-
ships. In this regard, Psarra’s analysis of actual
museums, mentioned above, is particularly relevant.
The conceptualisation of configuration and
design judgement
The historical example and the theoretical exper-
iment entail two kinds of conceptual shifts regarding
configuration. First, we have changes in the relation-
ships that hold interest, which lead to changes in the
description of the design: Kahn became interested in
the design of window recesses and the option of an
undulating wall. In the theoretical experiment we
declared an interest in the perceptual structure and
affordances of designs. Second, we have changes
in the rules of generation or derivation of form:
Kahn implicitly switched from an additive centripetal
and modular pattern of composition to a pattern of
subdivision between continuous inner and outer
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boundaries. In the theoretical example, new gram-
mars were created to allow the controlled pro-
duction of sub-sets of the original design world,
according to the perceptual structures engendered
by the individual designs. The two kinds of concep-
tual shift are associated with changes in configura-
tional reading. It so happens that in each case,
conceptual shifts are also overlaid upon a foun-
dation of invariance. With Kahn, what stays invariant
is the intention to adhere to a centralised plan. In the
experiment, what stays constant is the schema of a
room placed in the middle of another. More impor-
tant, in each case, visual work with drawings was an
indispensable step towards re-conceptualisation.
Kahn produced multiple sketches of the new
design principle for the outer wall, as well as
several new plans with the new arrangement. In
the case of the experiment, the emergent interplay
between geometric and syntactic centrality did not
become apparent until the outcomes of analysis
were visualised and visually explored.
Thus, what the historical example and the theor-
etical experiment have in common helps to highlight
the import of conceptual shifts during design. It also
helps explain why conceptual shifts can occur
beyond the early stages of the design process. Con-
ceptualisation is not limited to an original formu-
lation of the design problem as a whole, or to a
subsequent reformulation of the problem as a
whole based on a new understanding of design par-
ameters. Rather, it also encompasses new layers of
configurational definition and articulation, which
only emerge once the outline of the problem and
the design approach have been decided and a
domain of formal exploration has been etched out.
The differences between the historical example
and the theoretical experiment are as important as
the similarities. In the experiment, very simple gen-
erative rules are applied to generate a design
world. In actual design such a creation of a universe
of alternatives is usually not possible because the
generators of form are multiple and the possible
combinations almost always very many. By impli-
cation, exploration proceeds within a narrower
sub-set of possibilities based on design judgement
and informed by experience, knowledge of pre-
cedent or intuitions that may remain tacit. In the
experiment, the interrogation of the design world
is based on a small set of criteria, mostly limited to
the perceptual effects of designs. In actual design
this type of criteria would normally remain tacit, as
more pressing programmatic and performance con-
siderations (for example, required size, types and
relationships of spaces, services, and environmental
conditions) would take priority. In the experiment,
the evaluation of the perceptual effects of designs
is given computational precision through a fairly
extended analytical effort. In actual design this
would not often be the case. Judgement rather
than explicit evaluation would come into play.
From the point of view of configurational meaning,
differences come down to the fact that in the exper-
iment ‘generation’ (the initial shape grammar),
‘description’ (the analysis of perceptual structure)
and ‘discrimination’ (the identification of different
relationships between shape and syntactic centrality)
are marked as distinct procedural steps leading to an
abductive cognitive outcome: the final production of
new generative rules (the final shape grammars); in
actual design, the abductive leap, where it occurs, is
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about configurations, generativeprinciples and criteria
of judgement that are formulated in close interaction,
bridging all the time between presentational and dis-
cursive modes of symbolisation. The fact that design
addresses configurations, in the way we defined
them here, and the complex interplay between the
principles of parsing, functionality and derivation
inherent to configurations, explain why the tension
between presentational and discursive symbolisation
is so germane to architectural thinking. The theoretical
example we constructed serves to clarify with analyti-
cal precision what goes on when we manipulate con-
figurations, when we imaginatively read a logic of
entailment between relations that take into account
other relations. The historical example serves as a
reminder of how the abductive leap towards the con-
ceptualisation of logical form remains incompletely
formulated in practice, at least in terms of discursive
symbolisation. Hence the capacity of configurations
to activate imaginative attention.
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